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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Trust in central banking has become increasingly important to practitioners. Recently, the 
Eurosystem, as well as other monetary systems around the globe, has experienced a significant 
number of unconventional monetary policy measures. Besides keeping interest rates on the 
main refinancing operations historically low, the Governing Council of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) inter alia decided to intervene in the bond market through secondary market 
operations in order to combat the crisis. These interventions have been subject to substantive 
criticism saying that such bond purchases violate the ECB code of conduct. Here the question 
arises whether such unconventional measures do indeed run the risk of worsening the 
credibility of the ECB or benefit the trust-building process by stabilizing or even fostering good 
macroeconomic conditions. Hence, a systematic investigation of the drivers of trust in the ECB 
is desirable. 
 
We provide new evidence into which factors determine trust in central banking. We use a 
unique cross-country dataset based on Eurobarometer survey data covering the years 1999 to 
2010 which includes a rich set of socio-economic characteristics. We then supplement it with 
variables meant to reflect a country’s macroeconomic condition as well as regional 
developments. We find that besides individual socio-economic characteristics, macroeconomic 
conditions play a crucial role in the trust-building process which constitutes boundedly rational 
behavior in the trust-building process. Factors that are outside the control of the ECB should be 
irrelevant for the trust-building process of fully rational agents which is, however, not 
supported by our analysis. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that trust in the ECB can be strengthened by an improvement in 
general macroeconomic conditions in European countries. Therefore, current ECB market 
interventions may have positive effects on the overall level of trust in the long-run through 
strengthening and stabilizing effects on the European markets and the European economy in 
general.  
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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the ECB has experienced an unprecedented 
deterioration in the level of trust. This raises the question as to what factors determine trust in 
central banking. We  use a unique cross-country dataset which includes a rich set of socio-
economic  characteristics  and  supplement  it  with  variables  meant  to  reflect  a  country’s 
macroeconomic condition.  We find that besides individual socio-economic characteristics, 
macroeconomic  conditions  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  trust-building  process.  Our  results 
suggest that agents are boundedly rational in the trust-building process and that current ECB 
market operations may even be beneficial for trust in the ECB in the long-run. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Trust in central banking has become increasingly important to practitioners. Recently, 
the  Eurosystem,  as  well  as  other  monetary  systems  around  the  globe,  has  experienced  a 
significant  number of unconventional  monetary policy measures.  Besides keeping interest 
rates  on  the  main  refinancing  operations  historically  low,  the  Governing  Council  of  the 
European Central Bank (ECB) inter alia decided to intervene in the bond market through 
secondary market operations in order to combat the crisis. These interventions have been 
subject to substantive criticism
1 saying that such bond purchases violate the ECB code of 
conduct.
2 Here the question arises whether such unconventional measures do indeed run the 
risk of worsening the credibility of the ECB or benefit the trust-building process by stabilizing 
or even fostering good macroeconomic conditions. Hence, a systematic investigation of the 
drivers of trust in the ECB is desirable. 
The main aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the drivers of trust in  the 
ECB. In this context, we explore not onl y the importance of socio-economic characteristics, 
but also the effect of overall macroeconomic conditions during crisis and non-crisis periods. 
Our analysis consists of five parts. In the first part we shed light on the question as to 
what extent trust in the ECB is driven by individual socio-economic characteristics. We then 
supplement our dataset with variables meant to reflect a country’s macroeconomic condition 
in order to explain the observed differences in the level of trust between countries. It might be 
argued that those results are mainly driven by the occurrence of the financial crisis and the 
recent recession. To counter this objection, we augment our regression specification in a third 
step and control for the recent recession individually which allows us to shed light on the role 
of  the  crisis  in  the  trust-building  process.  In  a  fourth  step,  we  show  that  the  relative 
importance  of  our  macroeconomic  variables  increased  during  the  crisis,  suggesting  that 
people are even more attentive to changes in macroeconomic conditions during economic 
downturns  as  might  be  expected.  In  what  follows,  we  focus  our  attention  on  the  role  of 
regional  developments  net  of  countrywide  differences  as  recent  studies  have  shown  that 
modeling within-country heterogeneity is important in the context of, for instance, financial 
                                                           
1 See for instance Dombret (2011) and Weber (2011). 
2 According to § 123 (1) of the Treaty on the European Union (see for instance Foster, 2011), 
only  direct  purchases  of  government  bonds  are  forbidden,  not  purchases  through  the 
secondary market which provided a legal backdoor for the ECB to intervene. 2 
 
integration (Ekinci et al., 2009), participation in financial markets (Guiso et al., 2004), and 
household repayment behavior (Georgarakos and Fürth, 2010). 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The issue of trust or social capital in general is important both in sociology and in 
economics. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) review empirical studies and identify key features 
of social capital. Among those key features are externalities that are generated through shared 
trust, values, and norms. La Porta et al. (1997) find evidence that trust is negatively associated 
with corruption, but influences the justice system and the quality of bureaucracy positively. 
Similarly, Uslaner (2004) points out that trust and corruption are negatively associated. 
Concerning economic activity, Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) find that higher levels 
of trust are positively associated with stock market participation. In particular, they show that 
the effect of trust is stronger for wealthier households in certain European countries where 
stock market participation is limited and average levels of trust are low. Also, Georgarakos 
and Fürth (2010) examine household repayment behavior in Europe and point out that there is 
a  strong  correlation  between  a  bad  repayment  behavior  and  living  in  regions  with  low 
prevailing  levels  of  trust.  Furthermore,  Tabellini  (2010)  shows  that  key  determinants  of 
differences in economic developments across European regions are regional differences in 
values and norms, for instance measured by regional trust, whereas Guiso et al. (2004) find 
evidence that individuals who live in Italian regions with low social capital are more likely to 
obtain  loans  from  friends  and  relatives.  Trust  also  plays  an  important  role  for  economic 
growth. Studies by, for instance, Zak and Knack (1999) and Knack and Keefer (1997) show 
that higher prevailing trust has a positive impact on economic growth. 
We now turn to the rationale behind the association of trust with monetary policy or 
central banking in general. Barro and Gordon (1983) highlight, from a theoretical point of 
view,  the  essential  role  of  credibility  and  reputation  of  central  banks  for  the  conduct  of 
monetary policy. They show that discretionary monetary policy, in other words the ability of 
the central bank to reoptimize each period, leads to an inflationary bias. That is to say that the 
inflation rate will be higher than the one that is socially desirable. As credibility and trust are 
closely connected, it is difficult to disentangle them. Rogoff (1985) proposes the appointment 
of a conservative central banker who is more inflation-averse than society as a whole in order 
to overcome the inflationary bias. In a similar way, Walsh (1995) argues that performance 
contracts  are  able  eliminate  the  inflationary  bias.  In  both  cases,  however,  the  issue  of 3 
 
credibility and trust is still predominantly important as the public must be convinced that in 
fact a more conservative central banker has been appointed or that the performance contract is 
feasible and/or implementable, respectively. 
Furthermore, Clarida et al. (1999) show that expectation management is important in 
dynamic New Keynesian modeling. In the absence of cost-push and demand shocks, it can be 
shown that inflation is determined solely by the evolution of expected future output gaps, 
whereas the output gap in return is determined solely by the expected future paths of one-
period real interest rates. Hence, both output gap and inflation are forward-looking variables. 
The  public’s  expectations  are  clearly  influenced  by  the  issue  of  trust  in  the  ECB  which 
therefore  actively  tries  to  influence  the  formation  of  market  expectations  inter  alia  by 
signaling the future path of monetary policy through press conferences and keynote speeches. 
Despite the importance for central banks of how they are perceived by the public and 
especially the deterioration in the level of trust in the ECB during and after the financial crisis, 
there have been only a few studies that find empirical evidence for the determinants of these 
perceptions. For example, Fischer and Hahn (2008) study the determinants of trust from 1999 
to 2004 by using aggregated annual data and find that lower inflation and higher national 
income increases trust in the ECB. Gros and Roth (2010) use aggregated semi-annual data on 
trust in the ECB from 1999 to 2009 and find that only GDP growth has had a strong positive 
impact during the financial crisis. Those studies, however, are limited. First, they do not take 
account  of  the  fact  that  there  is  an  inherently  subjective  component  in  whether  or  not 
individuals have trust in the ECB. Neither study controls for heterogeneity in trust among 
households with different characteristics using micro-level data which we show are important 
drivers  of  trust.  Therefore,  we  would  expect  omitted  variables  to  be  a  problem  in  their 
regression specifications whenever any of the covariates under consideration is correlated 
with  the  omitted  socio-economic  characteristics.  Consequently,  the  results  presented  in 
Fischer and  Hahn (2008) and Gros  and Roth  (2010) capture correlations  rather than true 
causal relations. Second, no light is shed on the mechanism underlying the trust-building 
process. Third, as we will show in our study, regional developments also play an important 
role in determining trust in the ECB and have to be taken into account. 
3.  DETERMINANTS OF TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
3.1.  Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 4 
 
We  use  data  from  Eurobarometer  surveys  which  are  conducted  on  behalf  of  the 
European Commission at least twice a year in all European Union (EU) member states. The 
surveys cover a rich set of demographic characteristics in order to monitor the social and 
political attitudes of households in the EU. More specifically, we combine a selected set of 25 
Eurobarometer surveys in order to build a semi-annual repeated cross section from 1999 to 
2010.
3 Hence, we include the most recent survey data that is available.  One strength of the 
surveys is that several questions on attitudes towards European  institutions are asked at least 
twice a year, which makes it possible to construct the variable of interest, perceived  trust in 
the ECB, in all datasets. Specifically, the surveys ask the participants: 
“And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? 
(READ OUT): The European Central Bank“. 
The survey participants are then given the choice between the three possible answers: “1, 
Tend to trust”, “2, Tend not to trust”, and “3, Do not know”. 
The national level of trust is calculated as the relative share of survey participants in 
each national sample who answer “1, Tend to trust” to the question above. Figure 1 presents 
the mean response regarding trust in the ECB from 1999 to 2010 for selected EMU member 
countries used in the study
4. There are two main observations. First, with the start of the 
financial crisis, the selected countries experienced a substantial reduction in the mean level of 
trust in the first half of 2009. Second, the mean levels of trust show a substantia l variation 
over time as well as across the selected EMU member countries. Consequently, we present 
the mean levels of trust in the ECB for all of our EMU member countries for the whole time 
period from 1999 to 2010 in table 1. Starting with the first half  of 1999, the lowest level of 
trust  in  the  ECB  prevailed  in  France  with  the  highest  level  of  trust  prevailing  in  the 
Netherlands. Overall, mean levels of trust are quite heterogeneous across different countries 
and also different time periods and not all c ountries experienced an immediate drop in the 
level of trust at the start of the financial crisis. Therefore, the overall decline in trust cannot be 
explained solely by the occurrence of the financial crisis. However, as the crisis was heating 
up, the level of trust dropped in almost all of the countries under consideration. The lowest 
level of trust was reached in the second half of 2010 in Greece. One might argue that this is 
                                                           
3 A detailed description of the several datasets used can be found in the Appendix. 
4 The following countries are used in our study: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 5 
 
not surprising in the light of the ECB’s current interventions in Greece and in particular the 
ongoing fiscal crisis. 
Those descriptive statistics, however, have to be interpreted with caution. Lower mean 
levels of trust in one country compared to another one might also be driven by a variety of 
other  factors.  In  what  follows,  we  try  to  identify  those  factors  that  drive  the  observed 
differences in the level of trust between countries over time. Therefore, we use a rich set of 
socio-economic characteristics and combine those with variables meant to reflect a country’s 
macroeconomic condition and regional developments. Here we consider national real GDP 
growth, inflation deviations from the target level, government debt as a share of GDP, one 
year  government  bond  yield  spreads  over  German  bonds,  and  the  unemployment  rate. 
Regional GDP growth and the regional unemployment rate are used as regional indicators. 
Table  2  contains  summary  statistics  for  the  variables  under  consideration  for  the  whole 
sample as well as the samples corresponding to the crisis and non-crisis period, respectively. 
National real GDP growth rates are calculated based on a seasonally adjusted chain-linked 
quarterly real GDP time series. We argue that the average annual change of the Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is the relevant measure of inflation as it represents the 
principal measure of inflation that the citizens are mostly confronted with for instance in 
media coverage. Also, we argue that it is not absolute HICP inflation that is relevant for the 
determination of trust in the ECB and use absolute inflation deviations from the target level as 
potential determinants
5. Government debt is measured as the absolute government debt level 
relative to each country’s national GDP whereas the yields of one year government bonds 
with constant maturity are used in order to calculate the government bond yield spread over 
German bonds. The unemployment rate refers to the average national unemployment rate 
within the respective semester. A more detailed variable description can be found in table 3. 
3.2. 
 
The Role of Socio-Economic Characteristics 
                                                           
5 The ECB does not claim to target inflation. However, it has adopted an implicit inflation 
target of below but close to 2 percent. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the response 
of trust in the ECB to changes in inflation is not homogenous across the whole support of 
inflation. Rather, we would expect the sign of the response to be different to the left and to the 
right of the implicit inflation target. In addition, this approach is theoretically more appealing 
as it is in line with the quadratic-linear approach as presented for instance in Walsh (2010) 
and a central bank loss function that penalizes the central bank when realized inflation differs 
from the target level of inflation. 6 
 
In all subsequent analyses, we estimate a series of probit models. The probability that 
an individual has trust in the ECB in a certain period is expressed as a function of various 
socio-economic characteristics. Those characteristics include age, gender (male; with females 
forming  the  reference  group),  marital  status  (couple,  single,  divorced;  with  the  widowed 
forming the reference group), employment status (self-employed, retired, unemployed; with 
employees  forming  the  reference  group),  and educational  attainment  (high school degree, 
college degree; with those who did not complete high school forming the reference group). 
In table 4 (1) we present the results for the socio-economic characteristics. In table 4 
(2)  we  additionally  include  country  fixed  effects  which  absorb  most  of  the  countrywide 
differences. The results are qualitatively similar even after controlling for potentially omitted 
countrywide variables.  Being a couple (single) compared to  being widowed increases  the 
probability  of  trust  in  the  ECB  by  3.5  (1.5)  percent.  Males  have  a  2.8  percent  higher 
probability  of  trust  compared  to  females.  The  probability  of  trust  in  the  ECB  of  retired 
(unemployed) citizens is reduced by 1.5 (3.1) percent. The better educated individuals are, the 
more  likely  it  is  that  they  have  trust  in  the  ECB.  A  high  school  degree  increases  the 
probability  of  trust  in  the  ECB  by  3.5  percent  compared  to  those  individuals  not  having 
completed high school. For college graduates the effect is even stronger with 11.3 percent. 
Therefore, educational attainment seems to play the most important role among the individual 
socio-economic characteristics. These results are in line with Glaeser et al. (2000) who find 
that being male, married, and college educated increases trust. As an additional indicator, we 
consider the political views of the individuals. We find that individuals whose political views 
are more to the left of the political spectrum are less likely to show trust in the ECB. This 
result is in line with the findings of Algan and Cahuc (2009) who study the impact of civic 
attitudes on labor markets. They show that people with left-wing political views find it more 
justifiable to claim state benefits for which they are not eligible than those with right-wing 
political views. Moreover, the country dummies are mostly significant in this specification. 
Thus,  national  characteristics  seem  to  influence  the  probability  of  trust  in  the  ECB 
significantly. The omitted category here is Germany. For example, the probability of trust of 
French citizens is on average 11.6 percent lower compared to German citizens. For Dutch 7 
 
citizens,  on  the  other  hand,  the  expected  probability  of  trust  increases  by  the  substantial 
amount of 13.2 percent. This shows that not controlling for between-country heterogeneity 
would lead to misleading results. In what follows, we try to identify to what extent differences 
in macroeconomic conditions drive the observed differences in the level of trust between 
countries over time. 
3.3.  The Role of Macroeconomic Conditions 
We now add variables meant to reflect a country’s macroeconomic condition. These 
variables are national real GDP growth (GDP Growth), absolute inflation deviations from the 
target level (Inflation deviation), and the national unemployment rate (Unemployment Rate). 
Furthermore, two variables that are related to sovereign debt are included. Those variables are 
government debt as a share of national GDP (Government Debt) and one year government 
bond yield spreads over German bonds (Government Bond Spread). 
One would expect variables that are not related to the ECB’s mandate or are outside its 
control to be irrelevant for the trust-building process. However, if we assume that agents are 
boundedly  rational  and  do  not  fully  understand  the  mandate  of  the  ECB,  they  might  be 
influenced  by  such  factors  as  well.  For  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  literature  on 
behavioral finance, see Barberis and Thaler (2002). 
People  might  associate  good  economic  performance  measured  by  real  GDP  with 
personal welfare. Furthermore, good economic conditions in general which may be reflected 
by GDP growth turn out to be beneficial for the public as, for instance, already employed 
people are more likely to benefit through performance bonuses or incentive schemes. In a 
similar way, a high level of real GDP as a proxy for national income might be regarded as an 
indicator for the well-functioning as well as the efficiency of different economic institutions 
in  line  with  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997).  As  well-functioning  institutions  and  a  high  level  of 
efficiency are desirable, public perceptions may also be adjusted positively. Therefore, we 
include real GDP growth even though full rationality would imply no significant response of 
trust in the ECB to changes in this variable. 
The only variable in our study which is closely related to the ECB’s mandate concerns 
inflation deviations from the target level. The ECB’s primary objective of price stability is 
outlined in § 127 of treaty on the European Union. High inflation deviations from the target 8 
 
level might therefore suggest that the ECB is not capable of ensuring price stability or, more 
seriously, is not following its mandate. Hence, if the public understood the mandate of the 
ECB,  inflation  deviations  from  the  target  level  should  be  among  the  most  important 
determinants in the trust-building process. Consequently, one would expect this variable to be 
strongly negatively related to trust in the ECB. 
Relative government debt is restricted by the treaty on the European Union in § 126. 
By § 126 (2), the development on the budgetary situation and the stock of government debt 
shall be monitored by the European Commission and not by the ECB. Here, again, if agents 
do not fully understand that the ECB is not responsible for monitoring government debt, they 
may associate the financial situation in their home country represented by relative government 
debt with European institutions such as the ECB. Hence, we include relative government debt 
in our study. 
Government bond yield spreads are determined by various factors such as credit risk 
which  reflects  default  risk,  credit  spread  risks,  and  downgrade  risk.  In  this  respect,  the 
financial crisis had a significant impact on all of these 3 factors due to a weakening of the 
fiscal position resulting from, for instance, high costs for financial rescue packages and fiscal 
stimuli. Bernoth et al. (2004) find that debt sustainability has a significant positive impact on 
sovereign spreads. As we separately control for relative government debt and therefore long-
run sustainability in the spirit of Sturzenegger (2002), our variable does not reflect a change in 
debt sustainability. Moreover, the downgrade of several countries had a direct impact on the 
portfolio allocation of institutional investors since they mostly have only limited investment 
possibilities depending on the respective credit rating. The second factor is liquidity risk, in 
other words the risk that a certain asset cannot be traded as quickly as desired. However, 
Pagano and von Thadden (2004) and Favero et al. (2005) show that such liquidity premia in 
the European market almost vanished with the start of the EMU. De Santis (2012) shows that 
even in the current fiscal crisis, liquidity factors only play a minor role. 
We do not intent to specifically break down the different impact factors mentioned 
above such that our results for the government bond yield spreads over German bonds could 
still reflect a combination of those factors as well. We follow the approach that the public 
opinion about the institutional dealing is shaped by an aggregated observable measure such as 
government  bond  yield  spreads.  Especially  the  recent  crisis  and  frequent  reports  about 
changes in those spreads in combination with secondary market operations performed by the 9 
 
ECB  starting  mid-2009
6  may  have  shaped  public  perceptions  about  the  efficiency  of 
institutional dealings significantly. As we will show, the public seems to associate such  
government bond yield spreads negatively with the ECB. 
Despite already controlling for the individual employment status, we assume that 
agents’ perceptions are also shaped by the overall unemployment rate which can be thought of 
as a proxy for the unconditional probability of becoming unemployed. Hence, we include the 
unemployment rate in our study. 
Note that an endogeneity problem might arise because of simultaneous trust in the 
ECB and, for example, contemporaneous real GDP growth as studies have shown that trust 
plays an important role in determining a country’s economic growth. Zak and Knack (1999) 
and Knack and Keefer  (1997) show that higher prevailing trust  has  a positive impact  on 
growth.  In  order  to  overcome  this  problem,  we  perform  regression  analyses  on  lagged 
macroeconomic variables. In such a way, we rule out reverse causality and a bias resulting 
from simultaneity. This approach is, moreover, appealing because it is reasonable to assume 
that the public does not respond contemporaneously to changes in the covariates previously 
mentioned but is more likely to base its judgment of whether or not to trust the ECB on their 
experience in the recent past. 
In order to shed light on the importance of macroeconomic conditions, we include the 
corresponding variables in our study in table 5. We first run a separate regression for each of 
the five macroeconomic variables under consideration. The results for those specifications can 
be found in table 5 (1) up to (5). Subsequently, we include in table 5 (6) all  of the five 
variables in order to simultaneously control for a country’s macroeconomic condition. In the 
augmented  specification,  the  macroeconomic  variables  are  almost  all  significant  at  the  1 
percent level. Our results show that real GDP growth has a positive impact on trust whereas 
relative  government  debt,  government  bond  yield  spreads,  and  the  unemployment  rate 
influence trust negatively. More specifically, an increase in real GDP growth by 1.0 percent 
implies a 1.0 percent increase in the probability of trust in the ECB. An increase in relative 
government debt reduces the expected probability of trust. For example, an increase in Italian 
relative government debt from around 106 percent in 2008 to around 119 percent in 2010 
would  ceteris  paribus  imply  a  decline  in  trust  of  around  1.3  percent.  With  regard  to 
government bond yield spreads, the expected probability decreases by 3.0 percent given an 
                                                           
6 See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/l_17520090704en00180019.pdf for the decision 
of the ECB on the implementation of the covered bond purchase program. 10 
 
increase in  the spread by  1 percent.  An increase in  the unemployment rate by  1 percent 
implies a 1.2 percent reduction in the probability of trust in the ECB. Surprisingly, inflation 
deviations from the target level do not seem to play a role in the trust-building process once 
macroeconomic  conditions  are  controlled  for.  The  findings  concerning  the  effects  of  the 
individual socio-economic characteristics are qualitatively similar even after controlling for a 
country’s macroeconomic condition. The estimated coefficients are similar in significance, 
sign, and magnitude. 
One might argue that the results presented so far are driven by the fact that some 
survey  participants  were  simply  not  aware  of  the  ECB  and  its  mandate.  Therefore,  one 
question that is also frequently asked in Eurobarometer surveys proved to be very useful in 
that respect. The survey asks participants:  
“Have you heard of the European Central Bank?” 
As before, the survey participants are then given the choice between the three possible 
answers: “1, Yes”, “2, No”, and “3, Do not know”. Those survey participants who answer the 
question above with “2, No” or “3, Do not know” have never heard about the ECB or are not 
sure  about  the  answer  to  this  question.  We  would  expect  the  responses  of  these  survey 
participants to the question of whether or not they have trust in the ECB to partly have a 
random nature rather than being based on a profound judgment. In this context, the responses 
to  the  question  above  allow  us  to  run  the  same  regressions  again  for  a  subsample  of 
observations only. More specifically, we run regressions for the subsample of people who 
actually have heard about the ECB, in other words for those participants who answered the 
question above with “1, Yes”. We can thus reduce the random nature of the responses of 
survey participants regarding the question of trust in the ECB to a minimum. The results 
presented  before  are  still  confirmed.  With  the  exception  of  the  coefficient  on  inflation 
deviations, the estimated coefficients are similar in significance, sign, and magnitude. Trust 
shows a significant negative response to a change in inflation deviations from the target level. 
Hence, the ECB’s performance concerning its mandate seems to influence the trust-building 
process only when looking at the subsample of people who actually have heard about the ECB 
and  not  the  overall  sample.  This  seems  reasonable  from  an  intuitive  point  of  view  and 
highlights the importance of ECB communication. 
In fact, our results suggest that agents are boundedly rational in the trust-building 
process. First, variables that are either in the short-run or in the long-run outside the control of 11 
 
the ECB like, for instance, real GDP growth should be irrelevant for the trust-building process 
of fully rational agents which is not supported by our analyses. Second, one would expect 
fully rational forward-looking agents to be more strongly focused on long-run sustainability 
issues of government debt in the spirit of Sturzenegger (2002) rather than, for instance, on 
short-run credit risk. This, however, is also not supported by our analysis. We find that agents 
seem to put more weight on short-run credit risk in the trust-building process reflected by the 
substantial difference in the marginal effects.  
3.4.  A Structural Break in Trust During the Crisis 
As shown in figure 1, the mean levels of trust of selected EMU member countries 
underwent a significant drop in the first half of 2009. In order to check whether the results 
presented  so  far  are  potentially  driven  by  the  recent  recession,  we  additionally  include  a 
dummy variable
7 that is capable of shifting the probability of trust in the ECB r egardless of 
the values of the covariates. 
The results presented in this section are summarized in table 6. We find that our 
previous results are robust to the change in the specification. The financial crisis  had a 
negative  impact  on  the  probability  of  tr ust  in  the  ECB  as  expected.  When  all  our 
macroeconomic variables are included, the coefficient corresponding to the crisis dummy is 
significant at the 1 percent level and implies that the probability of trust was reduced by 2.0 
percent during that time period. This confirms that there was an overall significant reduction 
of trust in the ECB during the financial crisis net of differences in macroeconomic conditions 
and socio-economic characteristics. 
The results concerning our macroeconomic variables are robust to our change in the 
specification. The coefficients on real GDP growth, absolute inflation deviations from the 
target level, relative government debt, government bond yield spreads, and the unemployment 
rate are of similar significance and imply qualitatively similar responses compared to the 
results presented in the previous section. More specifically, an increase in real GDP growth 
by 1 percent implies a 0.8 percent increase in the probability of trust in the ECB. An increase 
in relative government debt, however, leads to an expected reduction in the probability of 
                                                           
7 Dating such a dummy variable is somewhat arbitrary. In order to present a transparent and 
coherent way of generating the dummy, we closely follow the Center for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR) Business Cycle Dating Committee (see http://www.cepr.org/data/dating/). 
The Committee has identified a recession starting in 2008 quarter 1 and lasting until 2009 
quarter 2. Consequently, we date the recession accordingly. 12 
 
having trust by 0.1 percent. Where bond yield spreads are concerned, the expected probability 
decreases by 3.0 percent given an increase in the spread by 1 percent. An increase in the 
unemployment rate leads to a reduction in the probability of trust by 1.2 percent. The response 
of trust in the ECB to changes in inflation deviations from the target level is also not affected. 
The findings concerning the effects of the individual socio-economic characteristics are again 
qualitatively similar even after controlling for a country’s macroeconomic condition and the 
incidence of the recent recession. 
3.5.  The Role of Macroeconomic Conditions During the Crisis 
In  the  previous  sections,  we  presented  the  impact  of  several  socio-economic 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables on trust in the ECB. Moreover, we controlled for 
the recent recession separately using a dummy variable that showed a significant negative 
impact on the probability of trust of around 2.0 percent. In what follows, we aim at identifying 
the relative importance of our macroeconomic variables during the crisis. In order to do this, 
we interact the variables we are interested in with the crisis dummy previously introduced. 
However, this has to be done with caution since our dependent variable is a binary variable 
and we model trust in the ECB in a nonlinear way. In recent years, there has been extensive 
discussion about how to interpret interaction effects in such nonlinear models in terms of 
marginal effects. A common mistake is to interpret the first derivative of the interaction term 
of two explanatory variables as the interaction effect. This is misleading as the interaction 
effect is represented by the cross partial derivative of both interacted variables which can be 
different  from  the  first  derivative  in  nonlinear  models.  This  makes  the  calculation  of 
interaction effects in nonlinear models a cumbersome task. Cornelißen and Sonderhof (2009) 
show how to interpret and calculate the effects of triple dummy variable interactions whereas 
Buis (2010) shows how to interpret interaction effects using multiplicative effects such as, for 
example, odds ratios, incidence-rate ratios, or hazard ratios. 
We follow the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004). Ai and Norton (2003) 
show that interaction effects in probit or logit models cannot be adequately computed using 
standard software packages and do not represent the true interaction effects. They show that 
the true effects can be of different magnitude and even of different sign. Standard inference is 
therefore problematic. One downside to their approach is that it is only possible to calculate 
one interaction effect at a time, precluding the inclusion of more than one interaction term 
simultaneously. In addition to the mean interaction effect, we provide a graphic illustration to 13 
 
show the full set of interaction effects. To the best of our knowledge, there is still no other 
valid technique for calculating more than one interaction effect at a time. We ran regression 
(6) in table 6 again and included the dummy variable corresponding to the recent recession as 
before as well as an interaction term of the macroeconomic variable under consideration with 
the  dummy.  This  provides  useful  insights  into  how  the  response  of  trust  in  the  ECB  to 
changes in any of the covariates mentioned before changes in times of crisis. The results 
presented in this section are summarized in table 7. 
The influence of real GDP growth increased during the crisis. We conclude that an 
increase in real GDP growth by 1 percent during the crisis increased the probability of trust on 
average by 1.1 percent more compared to non-crisis times. In times of crisis, the public seems 
to be more aware of economic conditions and adjust their judgment accordingly. Figures 2 
and 3 show the complete distribution of interaction effects and z-statistics, respectively. It can 
be seen that the interaction effects are in all cases larger than zero with the z-statistic always 
exceeding 5.0. Therefore the interaction effects are highly significant. 
We conclude from the interaction study that the influence of inflation deviations from 
the target level remained unchanged during the crisis as the interaction effects are in all cases 
negative  but  insignificant.  Figures  4  and  5  show  the  complete  distribution  of  interaction 
effects and z-statistics, respectively. 
Furthermore, the interaction effects of relative government debt are highly significant 
and negative. Figures 6 to 7 show the complete distribution of the interaction effects and z-
statistics, respectively. We find that the interaction effect is on average minus 0.2 percent. 
The interaction effects of the government bond yield spreads over German bonds are 
highly  significant  and  negative.  Figures  8  to  9  show  the  complete  distribution  of  the 
interaction  effects  and  z-statistics,  respectively.  We  find  that  the  interaction  effect  is  on 
average  minus  5.8  percent.  Hence,  the  associated  information  effect  of  government  bond 
spreads concerning the efficiency of the ECB due to, for instance, higher media coverage, 
seemed to increase. However, we have to take into account that in the case of Greece and 
maybe other European countries, government bond yield spreads might also measure liquidity 
effects. During the crisis, the ECB temporarily lowered the required rating of collaterals in 
liquidity provisions. At the end of 2009, it  announced that the pre-crisis minimum rating 
would be reestablished in 2011. This increased the future liquidity risk for instance for Greek 
bonds which were rated BBB+ at this time. Here, we might measure a negative reaction of the 14 
 
public to such a change in the policy as this change may have increased the uncertainty of 
market participants in the bond markets and therefore worsened sovereign spreads. Moreover, 
the increase in the effect of government bond yield spreads might be stronger due to the 
secondary market operations performed by the ECB which were not always successful in 
lowering sovereign spreads and therefore may not have been trust-building. However, such 
negative effects on trust in the short-run do not necessarily have to be trust-reducing in the 
future.  In  the  long-run  perspective,  trust-building  spill-over  effects  resulting  from  higher 
economic growth, lower unemployment rates, and the stabilization of the bond markets could 
potentially outweigh such a current negative effect. 
Finally, we consider the interaction effect of the unemployment rate. It can be seen 
that the interaction effects are in all cases smaller than zero and highly significant with the z-
statistic  always  being  smaller  than  minus  2.0.  Figures  10  and  11  show  the  complete 
distribution of the interaction effects and z-statistics, respectively. 
Our  results  suggest  that  the  relative  importance  of  our  macroeconomic  variables 
increased during the crisis. We conjecture that this  effect  is  due to an increase in  public 
awareness of the prevailing economic conditions during the crisis and in economic downturns 
in general. Only for inflation deviations from the target level, the trust response remained 
unchanged during the crisis. 
3.6.  The Role of Within-Country Heterogeneity 
Households living in the same country might still differ in their perception due to 
differences in the local environments, local developments in that specific country, or their 
satisfaction with  the work of regional political  parties. For instance, households living in 
different  regions  can  have  different  attitudes  towards  the  ECB  driven  by  different  local 
developments. Guiso et al. (2004), for instance, show that individuals who live in  Italian 
regions with low social capital are more likely to obtain loans from friends and relatives. Or 
Ekinci  et  al.  (2009) show that limited financial integration within and between European 
countries and regions is quite different. Following Tabellini (2010), the key determinants of 
differences in economic developments across European regions are regional differences in 
values and norms. Therefore, trust in the ECB, our key variable of interest, is likely to be 
influenced by such differences as well. 15 
 
In the context of modeling within-country heterogeneity, it is essential to present a 
uniform  and  consistent  breakdown  of  territorial  units  in  order  to  generate  the  necessary 
regional statistics. In our study, we use the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
(NUTS) which was introduced for the EU by Eurostat.
8 
The results presented in this section are summarized in table 8 where we show that 
regional GDP growth as well as the regional unemployment rate are significant determinants 
of trust in the ECB. In table 8 (1) we present the results for the regional indicators. We 
additionally include country fixed effects in table 8 (2) which absorb most of the countrywide 
differences. The coefficients are significant and imply that an increase in regional GDP 
growth results in an expected increase in the probability of trust by 0.1 percent. C oncerning 
the regional unemployment rate, the expected probability of trust is reduced by 0.3 percent 
given an increase in the regional unemployment rate by 1 percent. Unfortunately, due to 
limited  data  availability  concerning  regional  GDP  growth  as  well  a s  the  regional 
unemployment rate, we cannot simultaneously control for regional developments measured in 
terms of both variables and overall macroeconomic conditions. This would require us to leave 
out a substantial amount of data which we try to avoid whe never possible. However, recall 
that we include country fixed effects in table 8 (2) which control for most of the heterogeneity 
between the EMU member countries. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
We provide evidence for the main drivers of trust in the ECB using a unique cross-
country dataset covering the years 1999 to 2010 which we supplement with variables meant to 
reflect a country’s macroeconomic condition as well as regional developments. 
                                                           
8 The NUTS has a hierarchical order. Consequently, the NUTS 1 definition is the broadest 
definition and those regions include NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 regions and so forth.  In what 
follows, we provide the minimum and maximum thresholds for the approximate size of each 
NUTS region. A minimum of 3 million and a maximum of 7 million holds true for the NUTS 
1 level. For NUTS 2 regions, the minimum size is 0.8 million and the maximum 3 million 
whereas NUTS 3 regions have a minimum size of 0.15 million and a maximum size of 0.8 
million. We use the NUTS 2 definition from Eurostat in most cases and we end up with a total 
of 63 European regions for our 12 EMU member countries. 16 
 
Our  results  suggest  that  individual  socio-economic  characteristics  are  relevant  in 
determining trust in the ECB. We show that inter alia the employment status, educational 
attainment,  and  an  individual’s  political  orientation  are  central  factors  in  explaining  the 
variation in our dependent variable.  
Variables meant to reflect macroeconomic conditions are able to explain trust in the 
ECB in a significant way which constitutes boundedly rational behavior. First, variables that 
are either in the short-run or in the long-run outside the control of the ECB like real GDP 
growth  should  be  irrelevant  for  the  trust-building  process  of  fully  rational  agents.  This, 
however, is not supported by our analyses. Second, we include relative government debt and 
government bond yield spreads over German bonds which are closely related to sovereign 
debt. We find that agents seem to put more weight on short-run credit risk in the trust-building 
process  rather  than  on  the  long-run  sustainability  of  government  debt  reflected  by  a 
substantial  difference  in  the  marginal  effects.  This  is  counterintuitive  as  one  would  have 
expected  fully  rational  forward-looking  agents  to  be  more  strongly  focused  on  long-run 
sustainability issues. 
Consumer price stability as defined by the ECB does not seem to influence the trust-
building process significantly. We find that the ECB’s performance concerning its mandate is 
only relevant for the trust-building process when looking at the subsample of people who 
actually have heard about the ECB. This highlights the predominant role of communication 
and expectations management in general for the conduct and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Hence, it is advisable to intensify ECB communication to the public and in particular 
to people outside the economics profession or related areas. 
Finally, we present a uniform and consistent breakdown of territorial units in line with 
the  NUTS  nomenclature  provided  by  Eurostat  in  order  to  model  heterogeneity  within 
countries. The statistical significance of regional as well as national variables suggests that 
both regional and country-specific developments are important for the determination of trust. 
It is up to future research to further investigate the importance of regional development in 
addition to the results concerning regional GDP growth and the regional unemployment rate 
as presented as soon as more data for regional indicators is available. 17 
 
Overall,  our  results  suggest  that  trust  in  the  ECB  can  be  strengthened  by  an 
improvement in general macroeconomic conditions in European countries. Therefore, current 
ECB market interventions may have positive effects on the overall level of trust in the long-
run through strengthening and stabilizing effects on the European markets and the European 
economy in general. It remains to be seen in the future whether the loss of trust resulting from 
potential deviations from the ECB mandate which are currently put forward by economists 
and policy makers alike can be outweigh by positive spill-over effects through potentially 
higher  economic  growth,  lower  unemployment  rates,  and  stabilizing  effects  on  the  bond 
markets. 18 
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Table 1  Characteristics of Trust in the European Central Bank 
The table presents the average level of trust in the European Central Bank for different time periods and countries. 
Year  Period  Austria  Belgium  Germany  Spain  Finland  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Portugal  All 
1999  Q1-2  0.62  0.62  0.66  0.62  0.70  0.58  0.59  0.82  0.78  0.83  0.84  0.71  0.69 
Q3-4  0.65  0.63  0.63  0.70  0.64  0.57  0.57  0.77  0.77  0.70  0.89  0.82  0.69 
2000  Q1-2  0.55  0.66  0.58  0.70  0.61  0.61  0.74  0.80  0.71  0.74  0.84  0.78  0.68 
Q3-4  0.58  0.62  0.60  0.65  0.63  0.56  0.58  0.79  0.71  0.75  0.78  0.72  0.66 
2001  Q1-2  0.59  0.65  0.65  0.62  0.63  0.60  0.60  0.83  0.70  0.78  0.82  0.74  0.68 
Q3-4  0.67  0.70  0.69  0.68  0.71  0.63  0.66  0.85  0.78  0.80  0.83  0.72  0.72 
2002  Q1-2  0.65  0.65  0.73  0.62  0.71  0.55  0.65  0.83  0.83  0.80  0.81  0.79  0.72 
Q3-4  0.72  0.78  0.74  0.71  0.69  0.57  0.64  0.84  0.80  0.79  0.77  0.71  0.73 
2003  Q1-2  0.64  0.69  0.73  0.61  0.77  0.61  0.70  0.79  0.76  0.79  0.79  0.76  0.72 
Q3-4  0.64  0.62  0.66  0.63  0.68  0.53  0.76  0.81  0.72  0.78  0.72  0.72  0.68 
2004  Q1-2  0.57  0.65  0.67  0.65  0.77  0.56  0.73  0.82  0.65  0.79  0.77  0.70  0.69 
Q3-4  0.67  0.77  0.66  0.66  0.73  0.59  0.72  0.80  0.71  0.78  0.84  0.79  0.72 
2005  Q1-2  0.64  0.75  0.62  0.55  0.78  0.51  0.64  0.74  0.73  0.83  0.78  0.79  0.69 
Q3-4  0.63  0.68  0.65  0.57  0.62  0.51  0.59  0.79  0.63  0.83  0.79  0.79  0.67 
2006  Q1-2  0.63  0.71  0.65  0.63  0.72  0.52  0.58  0.78  0.75  0.78  0.82  0.73  0.69 
Q3-4  0.64  0.72  0.69  0.64  0.67  0.50  0.62  0.78  0.56  0.78  0.84  0.73  0.68 
2007  Q1-2  0.62  0.75  0.73  0.67  0.74  0.53  0.55  0.80  0.69  0.76  0.85  0.70  0.70 
Q3-4  0.66  0.71  0.74  0.63  0.74  0.59  0.53  0.77  0.61  0.77  0.88  0.67  0.69 
2008  Q1-2  0.63  0.72  0.69  0.78  0.78  0.56  0.50  0.83  0.64  0.77  0.89  0.74  0.71 
Q3-4  0.65  0.67  0.63  0.67  0.79  0.54  0.52  0.69  0.59  0.73  0.88  0.67  0.66 
2009  Q1  0.58  0.53  0.49  0.55  0.78  0.36  0.44  0.60  0.47  0.57  0.74  0.51  0.55 
Q2  0.65  0.63  0.60  0.53  0.77  0.50  0.42  0.64  0.60  0.77  0.76  0.64  0.62 
Q3-4  0.66  0.62  0.59  0.58  0.80  0.46  0.53  0.66  0.61  0.77  0.74  0.69  0.63 
2010  Q1-2  0.58  0.58  0.48  0.52  0.71  0.42  0.39  0.54  0.56  0.70  0.64  0.53  0.54 
Q3-4  0.53  0.64  0.55  0.47  0.66  0.47  0.31  0.59  0.58  0.74  0.72  0.57  0.56 
Total    0.63  0.67  0.64  0.62  0.72  0.54  0.57  0.75  0.67  0.77  0.80  0.70  0.67 
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Table 2  Summary Statistics 
  Full Sample  Non-Crisis Period  Crisis Period 
Variables  Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Trust in the ECB  188,037  0.686  0.464  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.691  0.462  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.660  0.474  0.000  1.000 
Age  188,037  48.335  16.519  20.000  99.000  155,649  47.965  16.476  20.000  99.000  32,388  50.113  16.614  20.000  98.000 
Male  188,037  0.505  0.500  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.507  0.500  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.496  0.500  0.000  1.000 
Couple  188,037  0.667  0.471  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.665  0.472  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.673  0.469  0.000  1.000 
Single  188,037  0.171  0.376  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.174  0.379  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.157  0.363  0.000  1.000 
Divorced  188,037  0.083  0.275  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.082  0.274  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.086  0.281  0.000  1.000 
Self Employed  188,037  0.097  0.295  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.098  0.297  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.091  0.287  0.000  1.000 
Retired  188,037  0.252  0.434  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.246  0.431  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.281  0.450  0.000  1.000 
Unemployed  188,037  0.199  0.399  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.202  0.402  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.180  0.384  0.000  1.000 
High School Degree  188,037  0.184  0.388  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.185  0.389  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.179  0.383  0.000  1.000 
College Degree  188,037  0.570  0.495  0.000  1.000  155,649  0.568  0.495  0.000  1.000  32,388  0.582  0.493  0.000  1.000 
Political Position  188,037  5.205  2.016  1.000  10.000  155,649  5.207  2.003  1.000  10.000  32,388  5.195  2.077  1.000  10.000 
GDP Growth  188,037  0.912  1.665  -6.037  7.764  155,649  1.272  1.311  -3.147  7.764  32,388  -0.817  2.054  -6.037  2.868 
Inflation Deviation  188,037  0.975  0.850  0.000  4.800  155,649  0.980  0.874  0.000  4.800  32,388  0.951  0.723  0.000  2.567 
Government Debt  172,409  66.071  27.041  5.500  132.450  140,021  66.442  27.227  5.500  132.450  32,388  64.469  26.158  6.700  118.700 
Government Bond Spread  179,796  0.194  0.769  -0.763  9.215  148,591  0.177  0.826  -0.763  9.215  31,205  0.271  0.389  -0.137  1.736 
Unemployment Rate  188,037  6.629  2.718  1.400  18.050  155,649  6.756  2.769  1.400  18.050  32,388  6.018  2.360  2.000  15.500 
Regional GDP Growth  140,629  4.988  2.970  -4.248  23.849  124,889  4.866  3.075  -4.248  23.849  15,740  5.958  1.653  2.438  10.321 
Regional Unemployment Rate  159,205  6.978  4.128  1.600  23.000  130,825  7.167  4.273  1.600  23.000  28,380  6.107  3.241  2.200  17.100 
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Table 3  Variable Description 
Variable  Description  Source 
Trust in the ECB  A dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent tends to trust the European Central 
Bank. 
Eurobarometer 
     
Age  The age of the respondent in years.  Eurobarometer 
     
Male  A dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is male or female.  Eurobarometer 
     
Couple  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is married, remarried, or currently living with 
partner. 
Eurobarometer 
     
Single  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent has never or previously lived with a partner.  Eurobarometer 
     
Divorced  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is currently divorced or separated.  Eurobarometer 
     
Self Employed  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is currently self-employed.  Eurobarometer 
     
Retired  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is currently retired or unable to work due to 
illness. 
Eurobarometer 
     
Unemployed  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent is temporarily not working, a student, or 
responsible for ordinary shopping only. 
Eurobarometer 
     
High School 
Degree 
A dummy indicating that the respondent was between 15 and 17 years old when full time 
education was completed. If the respondent was still in full time education at the time the survey 
was conducted, the education level corresponding to the respondent's current age was assumed. 
Eurobarometer 
     
College Degree  A dummy variable indicating that the respondent was more than 17 years old when full time 
education was completed. If the respondent was still in full time education at the time the survey 
was conducted, the education level corresponding to the respondent's current age was assumed. 
Eurobarometer 
     
Political Position  A scale ranging from 1 up to 10 in which the respondents place themselves and where 1 represents 
left-wing and 10 right-wing political views. 
Eurobarometer 
     
GDP Growth  Compounded national quarter-to-quarter growth rates of seasonally adjusted chain-linked quarterly 
real gross domestic product. 
Eurostat 
     
Inflation Deviation  The absolute difference between the average annual change in the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices and the European Central Bank’s implicit inflation target of 2 percent. 
Eurostat 
     
Government Debt  The absolute national level of government debt relative to national gross domestic product.  Eurostat 
     
Government Bond 
Spread 
The government bond yield spread over German bonds in the respective period using data on one 
year government bonds with constant maturity. 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
     
Unemployment 
Rate 
The average national unemployment rate.  Eurostat 
     
Regional GDP 
Growth 
The average regional gross domestic product growth rate identified using the Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics of the European Union. 
Eurostat 
     
Regional 
Unemployment 
Rate 
The average regional unemployment rate identified using the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics of the European Union. 
Eurostat 
     
Crisis Period  A dummy variable indicating the period from 2008 quarter 1 until 2009 quarter 2.  CEPR 24 
 
Table 4  Cross Sectional Probit Regressions - Socio-Economic Characteristics 
The table presents marginal effects from multivariate probit regressions using the delta method. Values of the z-statistics are in parentheses. 
Standard errors were corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The specifications account 
for age and political position through second-order polynomials. 
Variables 
Dependent: Trust in the European Central Bank 
(1)    (2)   
Marginal  
Effects   
Marginal  
Effects   
Age  0.001  ***  0.001  *** 
  (12.468)     (9.813)    
         
Male  0.029  ***  0.028  *** 
  (12.965)     (12.577)    
         
Couple  0.038  ***  0.035  *** 
  (8.481)     (7.782)    
         
Single  0.021  ***  0.015  *** 
  (3.895)     (2.860)    
         
Divorced  -0.022  ***  -0.016  *** 
  (-3.738)     (-2.860)    
         
Self Employed  -0.010  ***  -0.002    
  (-2.715)     (-0.530)    
         
Retired  -0.026  ***  -0.015  *** 
  (-6.728)     (-3.922)    
         
Unemployed  -0.031  ***  -0.031  *** 
  (-10.294)     (-10.536)    
         
High School Degree  0.037  ***  0.035  *** 
  (10.516)     (9.701)    
         
College Degree  0.111  ***  0.113  *** 
  (39.046)     (38.043)    
         
Political Position  -0.014  ***  -0.013  *** 
(Right to Left)  (-25.833)     (-23.405)    
Country Fixed Effects  No    Yes   
Observations  188,037    188,037   25 
 
Table 5  Cross Sectional Probit Regressions - Macroeconomic Condition 
The table presents marginal effects from multivariate probit regressions using the delta method. Values of the z-statistics are in parentheses. 
Standard errors were corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The specifications account 
for age and political position through second-order polynomials. 
Variables 
Dependent: Trust in the European Central Bank  
(1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
Marginal 
Effects   
Marginal  
Effects   
Marginal  
Effects 
  Marginal  
Effects 
  Marginal  
Effects 
  Marginal  
Effects 
 
GDP Growth  0.016  ***                  0.010  *** 
  (25.383)                    (13.583)   
                         
Inflation Deviation      -0.008  ***              0.002   
      (-6.727)                (1.201)   
                         
Government Debt          -0.002  ***          -0.001  *** 
          (-37.322)            (-22.856)   
                         
Government Bond 
Spread              -0.029  ***      -0.030  *** 
              (-21.068)        (-12.562)   
                         
Unemployment Rate                  -0.015  ***  -0.012  *** 
                  (-38.892)    (-26.703)   
                         
Age  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  *** 
  (12.956)     (12.506)     (11.276)     (11.408)     (11.256)     (10.336)    
                                     
Male  0.029  ***  0.029  ***  0.029  ***  0.031  ***  0.030  ***  0.032  *** 
  (12.787)     (13.006)     (12.647)     (13.437)     (13.246)     (13.531)    
                                     
Couple  0.039  ***  0.039  ***  0.037  ***  0.038  ***  0.038  ***  0.037  *** 
  (8.708)     (8.545)     (7.918)     (8.221)     (8.406)     (7.743)    
                                     
Single  0.022  ***  0.021  ***  0.022  ***  0.022  ***  0.022  ***  0.023  *** 
  (4.156)     (3.960)     (3.959)     (4.015)     (4.181)     (3.981)    
                                     
Divorced  -0.020  ***  -0.022  ***  -0.023  ***  -0.022  ***  -0.022  ***  -0.022  *** 
  (-3.470)     (-3.825)     (-3.895)     (-3.760)     (-3.731)     (-3.533)    
                                     
Self Employed  -0.011  ***  -0.010  ***  0.006     -0.003     -0.006     0.007  * 
  (-2.822)     (-2.601)     (1.540)     (-0.652)     (-1.574)     (1.763)    
                                     
Retired  -0.025  ***  -0.026  ***  -0.018  ***  -0.026  ***  -0.022  ***  -0.017  *** 
  (-6.599)     (-6.839)     (-4.510)     (-6.631)     (-5.799)     (-4.279)    
                                     
Unemployed  -0.031  ***  -0.030  ***  -0.029  ***  -0.030  ***  -0.026  ***  -0.026  *** 
  (-10.303)     (-10.082)     (-9.148)     (-9.941)     (-8.896)     (-8.094)    
                                     
High School Degree  0.037  ***  0.036  ***  0.028  ***  0.033  ***  0.032  ***  0.026  *** 
  (10.553)     (10.406)     (7.518)     (9.143)     (9.158)     (6.834)    
                                     
College Degree  0.112  ***  0.111  ***  0.116  ***  0.111  ***  0.103  ***  0.112  *** 
  (39.382)     (38.848)     (38.650)     (38.083)     (36.087)     (36.507)    
                                     
Political Position  -0.014  ***  -0.014  ***  -0.014  ***  -0.014  ***  -0.013  ***  -0.013  *** 
(Right to Left)  (-25.444)     (-25.869)     (-24.797)     (-25.580)     (-24.048)     (-22.715)    
Observations  188,037     188,037     172,409     179,796     188,037     165,112    
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Table 6  Cross Sectional Probit Regressions - Macroeconomic Condition and the Crisis Period 
The table presents marginal effects from multivariate probit regressions using the delta method. Values of the z-statistics are in parentheses. 
Standard errors were corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The specifications account 
for age and political position through second-order polynomials. 
Variables 
Dependent: Trust in the European Central Bank  
(1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
Marginal  
Effects    Marginal  
Effects 
  Marginal  
Effects 
  Marginal  
Effects 
  Marginal  
Effects 
  Marginal  
Effects 
 
GDP Growth  0.016  ***                          0.008  *** 
  (22.567)                             (8.829)    
                                     
Inflation Deviation        -0.009  ***                    0.001    
        (-6.851)                       (0.937)    
                                     
Government Debt              -0.002  ***              -0.001  *** 
              (-37.619)                 (-23.199)    
                                     
Government Bond Spread                    -0.029  ***        -0.030  *** 
                    (-20.691)           (-12.517)    
                                     
Unemployment Rate                          -0.015  ***  -0.012  *** 
                          (-40.260)     (-27.271)    
                                     
Crisis Period  0.002     -0.033  ***  -0.033  ***  -0.028  ***  -0.044  ***  -0.020  *** 
  (0.533)     (-11.553)     (-11.572)     (-9.500)     (-15.401)     (-6.005)    
                                     
Age  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  *** 
  (12.921)     (12.996)     (11.716)     (11.826)     (11.863)     (10.516)    
                                     
Male  0.029  ***  0.029  ***  0.029  ***  0.031  ***  0.029  ***  0.032  *** 
  (12.793)     (12.823)     (12.473)     (13.289)     (13.011)     (13.452)    
                                     
Couple  0.039  ***  0.039  ***  0.038  ***  0.039  ***  0.039  ***  0.038  *** 
  (8.702)     (8.697)     (8.050)     (8.349)     (8.607)     (7.804)    
                                     
Single  0.022  ***  0.022  ***  0.023  ***  0.023  ***  0.023  ***  0.023  *** 
  (4.153)     (4.087)     (4.061)     (4.112)     (4.362)     (4.024)    
                                     
Divorced  -0.020  ***  -0.021  ***  -0.023  ***  -0.022  ***  -0.021  ***  -0.021  *** 
  (-3.473)     (-3.696)     (-3.792)     (-3.651)     (-3.558)     (-3.497)    
                                     
Self Employed  -0.011  ***  -0.010  ***  0.006     -0.003     -0.006  *  0.007  * 
  (-2.817)     (-2.708)     (1.471)     (-0.768)     (-1.675)     (1.785)    
                                     
Retired  -0.025  ***  -0.027  ***  -0.018  ***  -0.026  ***  -0.023  ***  -0.018  *** 
  (-6.591)     (-6.937)     (-4.598)     (-6.715)     (-5.897)     (-4.317)    
                                     
Unemployed  -0.031  ***  -0.031  ***  -0.029  ***  -0.031  ***  -0.027  ***  -0.026  *** 
  (-10.292)     (-10.264)     (-9.331)     (-10.101)     (-9.081)     (-8.152)    
                                     
High School Degree  0.037  ***  0.037  ***  0.028  ***  0.033  ***  0.032  ***  0.026  *** 
  (10.546)     (10.520)     (7.598)     (9.263)     (9.249)     (6.811)    
                                     
College Degree  0.112  ***  0.112  ***  0.116  ***  0.112  ***  0.104  ***  0.112  *** 
  (39.354)     (39.121)     (38.866)     (38.326)     (36.328)     (36.535)    
                                     
Political Position  -0.014  ***  -0.014  ***  -0.014  ***  -0.014  ***  -0.013  ***  -0.013  *** 
(Right to Left)  (-25.445)     (-25.763)     (-24.714)     (-25.472)     (-23.824)     (-22.650)    
Observations  188,037     188,037     172,409     179,796     188,037     165,112    27 
 
Table 7   Cross Sectional Probit Regressions – Interaction Effects 
The table presents marginal effects from multivariate probit regressions using the delta method. The interaction effects were calculated using the 
methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004). Values of the z-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors were corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The specifications account for age and political position through second-order 
polynomials. 
Variables 
Dependent: Trust in the European Central Bank 
(1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   
Marginal  
Effects    Marginal  
Effects    Marginal  
Effects    Marginal  
Effects    Marginal  
Effects   
GDP Growth x  0.011  ***                         
Crisis Period  (-6.511)                            
                               
Inflation Deviation x        -0.007                      
Crisis Period        (-1.696)                      
                               
Government Debt x              -0.002  ***             
Crisis Period              (-13.252)                
                               
Government Bond Spread x                    -0.058  ***       
Crisis Period                    (-8.563)          
                               
Unemployment Rate x                          -0.004  *** 
Crisis Period                          (-3.434)   
                             
GDP Growth  0.005  ***  0.008  ***  0.009  ***  0.007  ***  0.007  *** 
  (5.361)     (8.920)     (9.904)     (7.962)     (8.625)   
                             
Inflation Deviation  0.001     0.001     0.002     0.001     0.001   
  (0.443)     (0.652)     (1.260)     (0.411)     (1.029)   
                             
Government Debt  -0.001  ***  -0.001  ***  -0.001  ***  -0.001  ***  -0.001  *** 
  (-23.741)    (-23.109)    (-23.313)    (-22.337)    (-23.246)   
                               
Government Bond Spread  -0.031  ***  -0.030  ***  -0.029  ***  -0.035  ***  -0.030  *** 
  (-12.882)     (-12.607)     (-12.025)     (-14.367)     (-12.703)    
                               
Unemployment Rate  -0.012  ***  -0.012  ***  -0.012  ***  -0.012  ***  -0.012  *** 
  (-27.280)     (-27.159)     (-27.723)     (-27.801)     (-27.460)    
                               
Crisis Period  -0.012  ***  -0.020  ***  -0.021  ***  -0.015  ***  -0.023  *** 
  (-3.384)     (-6.004)     (-6.337)     (-4.327)     (-6.503)    
                               
Age  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  0.001  *** 
  (10.613)     (10.495)     (10.366)     (10.519)     (10.465)    
                               
Male  0.032  ***  0.032  ***  0.032  ***  0.032  ***  0.032  *** 
  (13.429)     (13.451)     (13.405)     (13.476)     (13.459)    
                               
Couple  0.038  ***  0.038  ***  0.037  ***  0.037  ***  0.037  *** 
  (7.858)     (7.799)     (7.687)     (7.760)     (7.785)    
                               
Single  0.023  ***  0.023  ***  0.023  ***  0.023  ***  0.023  *** 
  (4.070)     (4.006)     (4.017)     (4.066)     (3.999)    
                               
Divorced  -0.022  ***  -0.021  ***  -0.022  ***  -0.022  ***  -0.022  *** 
  (-3.529)     (-3.495)     (-3.564)     (-3.565)     (-3.538)    
                               
Self Employed  0.007  *  0.007  *  0.007  *  0.008  *  0.007  * 
  (1.826)     (1.783)     (1.860)     (1.915)     (1.811)    
                               
Retired  -0.018  ***  -0.018  ***  -0.018  ***  -0.018  ***  -0.018  *** 
  (-4.368)     (-4.308)     (-4.349)     (-4.428)     (-4.348)    
                               
Unemployed  -0.026  ***  -0.026  ***  -0.026  ***  -0.025  ***  -0.026  *** 
  (-8.094)     (-8.148)     (-8.124)     (-7.987)     (-8.099)    
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High School Degree  0.026  ***  0.026  ***  0.025  ***  0.025  ***  0.025  *** 
  (6.835)     (6.794)     (6.653)     (6.595)     (6.739)    
                               
College Degree  0.112  ***  0.112  ***  0.111  ***  0.111  ***  0.112  *** 
  (36.635)     (36.547)     (36.169)     (36.349)     (36.370)    
                               
Political Position  -0.013  ***  -0.013  ***  -0.013  ***  -0.013  ***  -0.013  *** 
(Right to Left)  (-22.791)     (-22.657)     (-22.679)     (-22.795)     (-22.629)    
Observations  165,112     165,112     165,112     165,112     165,112    
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Table 8  Cross Sectional Probit Regressions – Regional Indicators 
The table presents marginal effects from multivariate probit regressions using the delta method for the period 1999 to 2008. 
Values  of  the  z-statistics  are  in  parentheses.  Standard  errors  were  corrected  for  heteroscedasticity.  ***,**,*  denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The specifications account for age and political position through second-order 
polynomials. 
Variables 
Dependent: Trust in the European Central Bank 
(1)    (2)   
Marginal  
Effects   
Marginal  
Effects   
Regional GDP Growth  0.004  ***  0.001  * 
  (8.043)    (1.716)   
         
Regional Unemployment Rate  -0.006  ***  -0.003  *** 
  (-20.818)    (-8.201)   
         
Age  0.001  ***  0.001  *** 
  (10.343)    (8.244)   
         
Male  0.022  ***  0.021  *** 
  (8.206)    (7.757)   
         
Couple  0.048  ***  0.048  *** 
  (8.668)    (8.629)   
         
Single  0.041  ***  0.035  *** 
  (6.172)    (5.248)   
         
Divorced  -0.011    -0.005   
  (-1.551)    (-0.772)   
         
Self Employed  -0.002    0.001   
  (-0.370)    (0.205)   
         
Retired  -0.011  **  -0.003   
  (-2.244)    (-0.742)   
         
Unemployed  -0.019  ***  -0.024  *** 
  (-5.321)    (-6.603)   
         
High School Degree  0.041  ***  0.034  *** 
  (9.559)    (7.665)   
         
College Degree  0.109  ***  0.111  *** 
  (30.918)    (30.312)   
         
Political Position  -0.011  ***  -0.011  *** 
(Right to Left)  (-16.843)    (-16.033)   
Country Fixed Effects  No    Yes   
Observations  122,575    122,575   
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Figure 1  Trust in the European Central Bank 
The figure presents the average level of trust in the European Central Bank for selected countries of our sample.  
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Figure 2  Interaction Effect of GDP Growth 
The figure presents the calculated interaction effect of GDP Growth presented in table 7 using all stated control variables. In order to calculate 
the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
 
Figure 3  Z-Statistic for the Interaction Effect of GDP Growth 
The figure presents the calculated z-statistics for the interaction effect of GDP Growth presented in table 7 using all stated control variables. In 
order to calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
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Figure 4  Interaction Effect of Inflation Deviation 
The figure presents the calculated interaction effect of Inflation Deviation presented in table 7 using all stated control variables. In order to 
calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
 
Figure 5  Z-Statistic for the Interaction Effect of Inflation Deviation 
The  figure presents the calculated z-statistics  for the interaction effect  of Inflation Deviation presented in table 7 using all stated control 
variables. In order to calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
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Figure 6  Interaction Effect of Government Debt 
The figure presents the calculated interaction effect of Government Debt presented in table 7 using all stated control variables. In order to 
calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
 
Figure 7   Z-Statistic for the Interaction Effect of Government Debt 
The figure presents the calculated z-statistics for the interaction effect of Government Debt presented in table 7 using all stated control variables. 
In order to calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
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Figure 8  Interaction Effect of the Government Bond Spread 
The figure presents the calculated interaction effect of Government Bond Spread presented in table 7 using all stated control variables. In order 
to calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
 
Figure 9  Z-Statistic for the Interaction Effect of the Government Bond Spread 
The figure presents the calculated z-statistics for the interaction effect of Government Bond Spread presented in table 7 using all stated control 
variables. In order to calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
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Figure 10  Interaction Effect of the Unemployment Rate 
The figure presents the calculated interaction effect of Unemployment Rate presented in table 7 using all stated control variables. In order to 
calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
 
Figure 11  Z-Statistic for the Interaction Effect of the Unemployment Rate 
The figure presents the calculated z-statistics for the interaction effect of Unemployment Rate presented in table 7 using all stated control 
variables. In order to calculate the interaction effect, the methodology provided by Norton et al. (2004) is used. 
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APPENDIX 
The Eurobarometer is a series of surveys regularly conducted on behalf of the Public Opinion 
Analysis sector of the European commission since 1973. We combine a selected set of 25 
Eurobarometer surveys which include our main variable of interest “Trust in the European 
Central Bank”. The surveys are mostly conducted on a semi-annual basis. An overview of the 
datasets used in our study can be found below: 
Study Number  Title  Year    Version 
ZA 5449  Eurobarometer 74.2  2010    1.1.0, 08.06.2011, doi:10.4232/1.10707 
ZA 5234  Eurobarometer 73.4  2010    1.0.0, 23.11.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10197 
ZA 4994  Eurobarometer 72.4  2009    2.0.0, 10.02.2011, doi:10.4232/1.10236 
ZA 4973  Eurobarometer 71.3  2009    2.0.0, 23.11.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10196 
ZA 4971  Eurobarometer 71.1  2009    3.0.1, 17.11.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10192 
ZA 4819  Eurobarometer 70.1  2008    3.0.1, 17.11.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10193 
ZA 4744  Eurobarometer 69.2  2008    3.0.1, 17.11.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10194 
ZA 4565  Eurobarometer 68.1  2007    4.0.0, 09.09.2010, doi:10.4232/1.10126 
ZA 4530  Eurobarometer 67.2  2007    2.0.0, 18.12.2009, doi:10.4232/1.10068 
ZA 4526  Eurobarometer 66.1  2006    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4526 
ZA 4506  Eurobarometer 65.2  2006    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4506 
ZA 4414  Eurobarometer 64.2  2005    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4414 
ZA 4411  Eurobarometer 63.4  2005    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4411 
ZA 4229  Eurobarometer 62.0  2004    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4229 
ZA 4056  Eurobarometer 61.0  2004    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.4056 
ZA 3938  Eurobarometer 60.1  2003    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3938 
ZA 3904  Eurobarometer 59.1  2003    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3904 
ZA 3693  Eurobarometer 58.1  2002    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3693 
ZA 3639  Eurobarometer 57.1  2002    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3639 
ZA 3627  Eurobarometer 56.2  2001    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3627 
ZA 3507  Eurobarometer 55.1  2001    1.0.0, 13.04.2010, doi:10.4232/1.3507 
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